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Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
Michael N. Schmitt* and Liis Vihul** 
I.  Discord Regarding Sovereignty 
In the late 1990s, the international legal community’s attention began to 
turn to a new form of warfare, then labeled “computer network attack,” a type 
of information operations.1  At the time, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
was at the cutting edge of thought regarding the legal significance of these 
operations.  By 1999 its consideration of the issue had matured, and the 
Office of the General Counsel released An Assessment of International Legal 
Issues in Information Operations,2 which considered the application of the 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules, space law, international 
telecommunication law, the law governing espionage activities, specific 
treaty regimes, and domestic law to military operations in cyberspace.  
Information Operations operated from the premise that international law 
applies in cyberspace.  This remains the U.S. approach nearly two decades 
later.3 
Yet, the document was cautionary. As it perceptively noted, the 
international legal system is reactive in the sense that it typically develops in 
 
 * Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Chairman, Stockton Center for the Study 
of International Law, U.S. Naval War College; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, Lieber 
Institute, U.S. Military Academy at West Point; Director, Tallinn Manual 2.0 Project.  The views 
expressed are those of the author in his personal capacity. 
 ** CEO, Cyber Law International; Managing Editor, Tallinn Manual 2.0 Project. 
1. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBL’N 3-13, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS viii, GL-5 (1998), http://www.c4i.org/jp3_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6LP-T4UJ] 
(approving the addition of “computer network attack” to the Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms).  Information operations are “[t]he integrated employment, during 
military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries 
while protecting our own.”  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBL’N 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 110 (2016), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WWV-NHYK]. 
2. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Office of Gen. Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues 
in Information Operations (2d ed. 1999), in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 459, 463–65 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) [hereinafter Information 
Operations]. 
3. There appears to be near-universal consensus that the extant international law governs cyber 
activities.  See, e.g., Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. GGE 2015 Report] (reaffirming and expanding upon 
the 2013 Report infra); Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter U.N. GGE 2013 Report] (highlighting international law’s 
significance for information and communications technologies). 
 Articles 
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response to particular situations and their consequences.4  This being so, the 
assessment warned, “we can make some educated guesses as to how the 
international legal system will respond to information operations, but the 
direction that response actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on 
the nature of the events that draw the nations’ attention to the issue.”5  
Evolution in the law’s interpretation in the cyber context was therefore 
inevitable. 
What appears to have changed since then is the DoD’s position on 
sovereignty in cyberspace.  In 1999, the question was not whether a State 
could violate another State’s sovereignty as a matter of law; rather, the 
challenge was identifying when cyber operations do so.  That the prohibition 
on violation of sovereignty is a substantive rule of international law was an 
assumption that permeated the assessment.  For example, it noted that in air 
law the entry by one State’s aircraft into another’s national airspace was 
“regarded as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”6  In the 
maritime environment, the document pointed to the 1949 Corfu Channel 
case,7 in which the International Court of Justice held that the penetration of 
Albanian territorial waters by British warships, and the minesweeping 
operation therein, without legal justification amounted to a violation of 
Albanian sovereignty.8 
Regarding cyber operations, the document observed that “[a]n 
unauthorized electronic intrusion into another nation’s computer systems 
may very well end up being regarded as a violation of the victim’s 
sovereignty.  It may even be regarded as equivalent to a physical trespass into 
a nation’s territory . . . .”9  And with respect to responding by cyber means 
against individuals or groups operating from other States, it noted that:  
[e]ven if it were possible to conduct a precise computer network attack 
on the equipment used by such individual actors, the state in which 
the effects of such an attack were felt, if it became aware of it, could 
well take the position that its sovereignty and territorial integrity had 
been violated.10 
Thus, as framed in the 1999 DoD assessment, certain State cyber 
operations against other States might violate the latter’s sovereignty, that is, 
constitute an “internationally wrongful act.”11  In the same vein, and over a 
 
4. Information Operations, supra note 2, at 464. 
5. Id. at 465. 
6. Id. at 464. 
7. Id. at 481. 
8. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 36 (Apr. 9). 
9. Information Operations, supra note 2, at 485. 
10. Id. at 488. 
11. An internationally wrongful act of a State consists of an action or omission that is 
attributable to the State under international law and constitutes a breach of an international 
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decade later, the premise of sovereignty as a primary rule of international law 
capable of being violated was accepted unanimously by the international law 
scholars and practitioners who prepared the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, as well as those who 
produced its 2017 successor, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations.12 
Recently, the DoD has indicated that it may have reassessed its position 
that sovereignty can be violated as a matter of international law in the cyber 
context.  The prospect surfaced publicly in a panel presentation by Colonel 
Gary Corn, the Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Cyber Command, at the 2016 
“CyCon U.S.” conference.13  Then, on the day before the President’s 
inauguration, Jennifer O’Connor, the Department’s General Counsel, issued 
a memorandum titled “International Law Framework for Employing Cyber 
Capabilities in Military Operations” that dealt with, inter alia, the subject of 
sovereignty.14 
Addressed to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands and very 
senior lawyers throughout the DoD, the memorandum was initially 
unclassified and circulated widely internationally.  However, it was later 
designated as “for internal use only,” and distribution is now restricted.15  
Nevertheless, Corn and former Principal Deputy General Counsel of the DoD 
Robert Taylor have since published on the subject.16  Considering their 
positions as, respectively, the most senior legal advisor for the U.S. 
organization that engages in military cyber operations, the author of the 
memorandum, and a highly placed DoD attorney at the time it was issued, it 
 
obligation of the State.  G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, art. 2 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
12. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 
1 (Michael M. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; TALLINN 
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt 
ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0]. Primary rules are those which impose either 
obligations or prohibitions on States.  They must be distinguished from secondary rules of 
international law, that is, “the general conditions under international law for the State to be 
considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow 
therefrom.”  Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.  Examples of secondary rules include those 
regarding attribution and the remedies that are available to States when international law obligations 
owed them are breached. 
13. Colonel Corn was, however, speaking in his personal capacity.  The authors spoke on the 
same panel. 
14. Memorandum from Jennifer M. O’Connor, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., International 
Law Framework for Employing Cyber Capabilities in Military Operations (Jan. 19, 2017); see infra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
15. As one of the authors is a DoD employee, the document cannot be quoted in this article. 
16. Gary Corn, Tallinn Manual 2.0—Advancing the Conversation, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 15, 
2017) https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancing-conversation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/T5XL-XK53]; Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, AM. J. 
INT’L L. UNBOUND (forthcoming). 
SCHMITT.VIHUL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/17  8:43 AM 
1642 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:1639 
is reasonable to assume that their views are consistent with the DoD’s 
position. 
By their approach, sovereignty does not operate as a rule of international 
law, the violation of which results in international legal responsibility.17  
Instead, it is a “baseline principle . . . undergirding binding norms,”18 
particularly the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force and 
the customary international law prohibition on coercive intervention.19  This 
article examines the point of contention between the DoD’s earlier view, as 
well as the Tallinn Manuals’, and that which now appears to be the revised 
DoD position.  Part II assesses the legal logic underlying the argument 
against the existence of such a rule and sets forth the position of the authors 
on the matter.  Drawing on the approach adopted in Tallinn Manual 2.0, it 
focuses on territorial sovereignty and its inviolability by other States.  In Part 
III, evidence that the prohibition on violating sovereignty reflects customary 
international law is surveyed.  Included are discussions of treatment of the 
matter by international tribunals, States, and international organizations.  A 
brief illustration of how the two views might play out in practice is offered 
in Part IV, together with the authors’ thoughts on the possible consequences 
of the debate. 
II.  Assessing the Argument Against a Primary Rule on Violations of 
Sovereignty 
As noted, the authors of the two Tallinn Manuals unanimously agreed 
that the principle of sovereignty proscribes certain cyber operations 
conducted by States against other States.  Tallinn Manual 2.0 accordingly 
provides in Rule 4 that “[a] State must not conduct cyber operations that 
violate the sovereignty of another State.”20  Corn took issue with the 
substance of the rule in a Just Security post that followed publication of the 
Manual and was subsequently joined by Taylor in an AJIL Unbound piece 
further developing the position.21 
Much of the argument they put forth is uncontroversial.  For instance, 
both sides of the debate agree that the principle of sovereignty is the basis for 
the international law prohibitions of intervention and use of force.22  Yet, 
advocates of the “sovereignty-as-principle-only” approach draw the line at 
these two internationally wrongful acts, rejecting any directly operative 
 
17. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
18. Corn, supra note 16. 
19. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
20. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 17 (Rule 4). 
21. Corn, supra note 16; Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
22. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 11–12. 
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effect of the principle itself, such as a rule prohibiting the breach of territorial 
inviolability.  According to Corn and Taylor: 
[I]t is widely recognized that states have unquestioned authority to 
prohibit espionage within their territory under their domestic laws, but 
it is also widely recognized that international law does not prohibit 
espionage.  States have long engaged in espionage operations that 
involve undisclosed entry and activities within the territory of other 
states, subject only to the risk of diplomatic consequences or the 
exercise of domestic jurisdiction over intelligence operatives if 
discovered and caught.  Within this framework, it is understood that 
espionage may violate international law only when the modalities 
employed otherwise constitute a violation of a specific provision of 
international law, such as an unlawful intervention or a prohibited use 
of force.  Thus states conduct intelligence activities in and through 
cyberspace, and generally, “to the extent that cyber operations 
resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities . . . 
such cyber operations would likely be treated similarly under 
international law.”  This framework applies equally to cyber 
operations directed at terrorist cyber infrastructure located within the 
territory of another state. 
 Further, the differences in how sovereignty is reflected in 
international law with respect to the domains of space, air, and the seas 
further supports the view that sovereignty is a principle, subject to 
adjustment depending on the domain and the practical imperatives of 
states rather than a hard and fast rule.  For instance, in the case of the 
space domain, objects in orbit are beyond the territorial claims of any 
nation, and outer space – including outer space above another state’s 
territory – is available for exploitation by all.  In the case of the air 
domain, the regime is highly restrictive, such that any unconsented 
entry into the airspace of another state is regarded as a serious 
violation of international law subject to such exceptions as self-
defense, Security Council authorization, or force majeure.  In the case 
of the seas, many entries into and travels through the territory of 
another state are permissible without the consent of that state, but there 
are conditions under which such entry would be a violation of 
international law – it depends on the particular facts and 
circumstances.  The fact that states have developed vastly different 
regimes to govern the air, space, and maritime domains underscores 
the fallacy of a universal rule of sovereignty with a clear application 
to the domain of cyberspace.  The principle of sovereignty is 
universal, but its application to the unique particularities of the 
cyberspace domain remains for states to determine through state 
practice and/or the development of treaty rules.23 
 
23. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16 (emphasis omitted). 
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This is where their argument breaks down, for it fails to recognize that 
each of the legal regimes cited—air, space, maritime, and that governing 
espionage—are premised on territorial integrity and inviolability.  Regarding 
the air domain, consider a Russian military aircraft that briefly “cuts the 
corner” into Estonian airspace.  There is no State practice supporting 
treatment of these incidents, which are the subject of the ongoing NATO 
Baltic Air Policing mission, as a use of force or coercive intervention.24  On 
the contrary, they constitute violations of Estonian national airspace,25 and 
thereby its territorial sovereignty.  As will be seen, this is the generally 
consistent approach States take to aerial intrusions into inviolable national 
airspace.26 
With respect to outer space, States have confirmed in treaty law that it 
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.27  This 
indicates that but for that rule, which is now accepted as customary in nature, 
territorial sovereignty would by default be viewed as extending beyond the 
airspace above a State’s sovereign territory into outer space.  Space law is 
therefore lex specialis that allows, for instance, States to place space objects 
into geostationary orbit above the subjacent territory of other States.28  It is a 
legal accommodation agreed to by States that is designed to permit them to 
operate in outer space in ways that might otherwise be prohibited through 
application of the lex generalis rules of territorial sovereignty. 
The law of the sea also supports the primary-rule status of territorial 
sovereignty.  Recall that Corn and Taylor opine, in reference to maritime 
activities, that “many entries into and travels through the territory of another 
 
24. See NATO Air—Policing Mission, LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES, https://kariuomene. 
kam.lt/en/structure_1469/air_force/nato_air_-_policing_mission.html [https://perma.cc/E82T-
QQT8] (updated Mar. 1, 2017) (“NATO allies provided 34 rotations of air capabilities to patrol the 
Baltic airspace over the span of the mission . . . to fill in the Baltic States’ shortage of relevant 
aircraft for independent protection of national airspace.”). 
25. See, e.g., Estonia Says Russian Aircraft Violated Airspace Again, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-estonia-airspace-
violated/27970888.html [https://perma.cc/9JCW-3A3Q] (recounting the Estonian military’s claim 
that a Russian aircraft violated Estonian airspace by flying within it “without permission for about 
90 seconds”). 
26. The Chicago Convention provides, “The contracting States recognize that every State has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”  Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.  Use of the term 
“recognize” confirms the customary international law character of such sovereignty. 
27. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
28. See, e.g., Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space and the Character and Utilization of 
the Geostationary Orbit, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ch. 12, § C(4) at 722 (“Article II . . . further states that outer space is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty or by any other means.  Thus, a signatory . . . cannot 
appropriate a position in the [geostationary orbit] either by claim of sovereignty or by means of use, 
or even repeated use, of such an orbital position.”). 
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State are permissible without the consent of that State, but there are 
conditions under which such entry would be a violation of international 
law—it depends on the facts and circumstances.”29  While their statement of 
the law is correct, the authors fail to acknowledge the reason why consent of 
the coastal States need not be obtained when another State’s vessel wishes to 
sail through the former’s territorial sea.  States have long enjoyed territorial 
inviolability vis-à-vis their coastal waters.  The regimes of innocent, transit, 
and archipelagic passage developed as customary and treaty-law exceptions 
to the territorial sea’s inviolability;30 they modify the baseline principle that 
maritime borders may not be pierced by other States.31  Territorial 
inviolability remains intact, subject to the exceptions. 
Finally, the issue of espionage can also be viewed through the prism of 
territorial sovereignty.  Corn and Taylor point to the long-standing State 
practice of engaging in espionage activities on foreign territory, which they 
suggest is not viewed by States as a violation of international law.32  Although 
they do not set forth the legal basis for this conclusion, a plausible argument 
supporting it is that, based on the extensive State practice of conducting 
espionage abroad, espionage constitutes a customary exception to the general 
rule that territorial sovereignty is inviolable.  The weakness in this rationale 
is the limited amount of opinio juris on point, for a new customary 
international law rule must be grounded in both State practice and opinio 
juris.   
By the opposing view, espionage on another State’s territory is de jure 
a violation of that State’s territorial sovereignty.33  For those advocating this 
position, the question in the case of remotely conducted cyber-espionage 
operations, therefore, would be identical to that which must be asked of any 
other cyber operation—at what point does an operation that does not entail 
physical presence on another State’s territory qualify as a violation of 
territorial sovereignty?  The manner in which the Tallinn Manual 2.0 answers 
this question is set out below.  But irrespective of which side of the debate 
 
29. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
30. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 17, 38, 52, 53, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].  
31. This conclusion is without prejudice to authorization or mandate by the U.N. Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, operations conducted pursuant to the right of self-
defense, or situations provided for in the law of the sea, such as force majeure or distress.  See U.N. 
Charter arts. 42 (providing the basis for “peace enforcement” operations), 51 (affirming the right of 
self-defense); Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 30, art. 18, ¶ 2 (allowing stopping and 
anchoring in territorial seas as rendered necessary by exigent circumstances). 
32. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
33. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 18–19, 171 (noting that “[i]n the cyber 
context . . . it is a violation of territorial sovereignty for an organ of a State, or others whose conduct 
may be attributed to the State, to conduct cyber operations while physically present on another 
State’s territory,” and suggesting the majority view is that cyber espionage would constitute 
violation of sovereignty if the individual committing the espionage operation “is on another State’s 
territory while nonconsensually engaging in the operation”). 
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one takes, territorial sovereignty resides at the heart of the underlying legal 
logic. 
To bolster their position on territorial sovereignty, Corn and Taylor turn 
to the work of scholars, principally Ian Brownlie’s classic work, 
International Law.34  It is true that Brownlie characterizes the term 
“sovereignty” as “rather descriptive in character, referring in a ‘catch-all’ 
sense to the collection of rights held by a state.”35  What they fail to note, 
however, is that Brownlie, citing Corfu Channel, undeniably sees territorial 
inviolability as one of those rights and observes that other States accordingly 
shoulder a “correlative duty of respect for territorial sovereignty.”36 
The seminal treatise in the field, Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law, 
also endorses the notion that territorial sovereignty must be respected and 
that failure to do so constitutes a violation of international law.  This view 
was advanced in the book’s first edition, published in 1905. 
The duty of every State to abstain itself and to prevent its organs and 
subjects from any act which contains a violation of another State’s 
independence or territorial and personal supremacy is correlative to 
the respective right of the other State.  It is impossible to enumerate 
all such actions as might contain a violation of this duty.  But it is of 
value to give some illustrative examples. . . .  Further, in the interest 
of the territorial supremacy of other States, a State is not allowed to 
send its troops, its men-of-war, and its police forces into or through 
foreign territory, or to exercise an act of administration or jurisdiction 
on foreign territory, without permission.37 
It has stood the test of time, for, although revised to accommodate new 
factual circumstances and the maturation of international law, the analysis 
was maintained by each of the book’s distinguished subsequent editors.38  
The most recent edition (9th), published in 1992, provides, 
 
34. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
35. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 448 (8th 
ed. 2012). 
36. Id.; see also James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 
121 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012) (“As a general matter, [sovereign] 
authority is exclusive: normally, governmental activity carried out on the territory of another state 
is only lawful if performed there with the latter’s consent . . . .”); H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 270 (1861) (“Every right has its correlative duty,” which in the present context would mean 
that a State’s right to exclusive authority within its territory carries with it the correlative duty to 
respect the same right of other States); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (7th ed. 
2014) (“The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states is well founded as one of the 
linchpins of the international system, as is the norm prohibiting interference in the internal affairs 
of other states.”). 
37. LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 172–73 (1905). 
38. R.F. Roxburgh, Lord Arnold McNair, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Robert Jennings, and Sir 
Arthur Watts. 
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All states are under an international legal obligation not to commit any 
violation of the independence, or territorial or personal authority, of 
any other state. 
 . . . . 
 It is not feasible to enumerate all such actions as might constitute 
a breach of a state’s duty not to violate another state’s independence 
or territorial or personal authority.  But it is useful to give some 
illustrative examples. . . .  A state is not allowed to send its troops, its 
warships, or its police forces into or through foreign territory, or its 
aircraft over it, or to carry out official investigations on foreign 
territory or to let its agents conduct clandestine operations there, or to 
exercise an act of administration or jurisdiction on foreign territory, 
without permission.39 
As is apparent, it is misguided to assert that there must exist a cyber-
specific rule for cyber operations not amounting to a wrongful use of force 
or coercive intervention, but manifesting on another State’s territory, to 
qualify as violations of territorial sovereignty.  The pressing task is, instead, 
to identify the criteria for violation thereof by means of cyber operations.  
Only if lex specialis subsequently emerges through treaty or crystallization 
of customary law, as in the case of outer space, will cyber operations that 
would otherwise violate a State’s territorial sovereignty be permissible. 
Treating violations of sovereignty as a primary rule of international law, 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 seeks to add granularity to the circumstances in which a 
cyber operation might violate a State’s territorial sovereignty.  The 
commentary to Rule 4, set out above, provides that, as a general matter, 
“[c]yber operations that prevent or disregard another State’s exercise of its 
sovereign prerogatives constitute a violation of such sovereignty and are 
prohibited by international law.”40  States enjoy sovereignty over cyber 
infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities located on their territory.41  This 
includes both public and private cyber infrastructure.42 
For the experts who produced Tallinn Manual 2.0, the difficulty lay in 
identifying those cyber operations that would violate it.  They conducted their 
analysis along two axes: “(1) the degree of infringement upon the target 
 
39. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 382, 385–86 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
40. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 17. 
41. Id. at 13 (Rule 2). 
42. Id. at 13–14.  This is without prejudice to exceptions provided for in law, such as diplomatic 
protection.  See, e.g., id. at 209 (“‘Premises of a mission’ refers to ‘the buildings or parts of buildings 
and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for the purposes of the mission.’”) 
(quoting Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 1(i), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95); id. at 212 (“Cyber infrastructure on the premises of a diplomatic mission or consular 
post is protected by the inviolability of that mission or post.”). 
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State’s territorial integrity; and (2) whether there has been an interference 
with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions.”43 
With respect to infringement on territorial integrity, there was consensus 
that a State’s cyber operation causing physical damage or injury on the 
territory of another State violates the latter State’s territorial sovereignty.  
The group also concurred that a cyber operation resulting in a loss of 
functionality (such that the targeted cyber infrastructure or the equipment 
upon which it relies needs to be repaired or replaced) qualifies as a violation.  
No consensus could be achieved, however, as to remote cyber operations 
generating other consequences.  Some experts treated the aforementioned 
consequences as the threshold for violation.  Others suggested that violations 
of sovereignty might include additional operations but were unable to agree 
upon a definitive threshold to apply.44 
Clearly, however, not all cyber operations that manifest, either partially 
or totally, on another State’s cyber infrastructure infringe that State’s 
territorial inviolability.45  As an example, the transmission of propaganda by 
one State into other States from platforms in outer space or on the high seas 
is not considered to violate sovereignty, even when done against the target 
States’ wills.46  The examples cited by Corn and Taylor would generally fall 
into this category.  It is correct that cyber operations involving “cyber effects 
in, yet invisible to, the territorial State, but that only manifest operationally 
in the area of hostilities”47 are generally permissible. Similarly, “[w]here the 
proposed cyber action is focused solely against the individual accounts or 
facilities of terrorists or terrorist organizations widely recognized as such, 
and when the cyber actions will generate only de minimis effects on 
nonterrorist infrastructure within the host State, international law does not 
preclude those cyber actions.”48  Yet, citing select examples of cyber 
operations that States are unlikely to consider violations of territorial 
sovereignty does not disprove the existence of a primary rule prohibiting 
breaches of territorial inviolability in other cases.  On the contrary, it 
demonstrates the need to develop interpretive criteria by which that rule will 
be applied. 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 additionally notes that a violation of sovereignty 
occurs whenever a cyber operation interferes with or usurps another State’s 
inherently governmental functions.49  This is the natural consequence of the 
 
43. Id. at 20. 
44. Id. at 20–21. 
45. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 385 (“However, not all acts 
performed by one state in the territory of another involve a violation of sovereignty.”). 
46. BRUCE A. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 29–30 (1986). 
47. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
48. Id. at 7. 
49. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 21.  The experts found it difficult to define 
“inherently governmental functions” with granularity.  Id. at 22.  However, certain functions plainly 
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fact that, pursuant to the notions of internal and external sovereignty,50 these 
functions fall within the exclusive purview of the State.  Such violations need 
not be accompanied by any damage or injury, and unlike the prohibition on 
intervention into a State’s domaine réservé, no coercive intent or effect is 
required.  However, as the focus of the debate over sovereignty is on its 
territorial aspect, the discussion that follows shall be limited to territorial 
sovereignty and its inviolability. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach to sovereignty appears to be widely 
shared.  Little criticism of the “sovereignty-as-rule” position, which was also 
reflected in the first edition of the Tallinn Manual,51 was heard during the 
nearly four years between publication of the two editions.  On the contrary, 
discussion of sovereignty in the cyber context surrounded the identification 
of those cyber activities that might violate another State’s sovereignty. 
Additionally, a draft of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 rule on violation of 
sovereignty and its accompanying commentary was discussed in three 
meetings of over fifty States and international organizations that were 
convened by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015 and 2016.52  
Many of the States subsequently provided voluminous unofficial written 
comments.  They voiced no meaningful objection to Rule 4.  Instead, the 
comments focused on application of the rule to specific situations.  There was 
even consideration of whether the prohibition encompassed cyber activities 
by non-State groups, a view acknowledged, but not accepted, in the 
Manual.53  Throughout this process, it appeared to be received knowledge 
that a primary rule on territorial-sovereignty violations existed and applied 
to cyber operations. 
III.  Evidence of a Primary Rule on Violations of Sovereignty 
The question at hand is whether the principle of sovereignty operates as 
a primary rule of customary international law, imposing an obligation on 
States to respect the inviolability of other States’ territories.54  If so, it 
 
qualify.  For example, law enforcement is a function reserved to the State alone.  Accordingly, if 
one State conducts law enforcement by cyber means, such as remote electronic search, on another 
State’s territory without the latter’s consent, a violation of sovereignty has taken place. 
50. Id. at 13 (Rule 2); id. at 16 (Rule 3). 
51. TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 12. 
52. Michael Schmitt, The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations: 
What It Is and Isn’t, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37559/tallinn-
manual-2-0-international-law-cyber-operations/ [https://perma.cc/5YRS-F5TB]. 
53. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 18. 
54. Customary international law is described in the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
as “a general practice accepted as law.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), 
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  “Crystallization” of 
customary international law requires two elements¾State practice (usus) and the conviction that 
said practice is engaged in, or refrained from, out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).  
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3) 
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imposes significant operational limits on State activities on, or with effects 
in, the territory of those States. 
In the view of the authors, overwhelming evidence of State practice and 
opinio juris—the foundational elements of customary international law—
supports the assertion that a primary rule not to violate the territorial 
sovereignty of other States exists.  Examples of such practice and opinio juris 
are offered below.  Additionally, pursuant to Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, “judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” constitute 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”55  Since judicial 
decisions, in particular those of the International Court of Justice, are 
especially persuasive subsidiary means for assessing whether a customary 
law rule has crystallized,56 the examination of the supporting evidence begins 
with an appraisal of a number of key cases.  As to the work of highly qualified 
publicists (scholars), the scholarship cited earlier self-evidently qualifies as 
such.  Significant in the cyber context are the two Tallinn Manuals, the 
collective work of nearly forty scholars, many of whom are internationally 
renowned.  They too would meet the requirements of Article 38(1)(d).57  
Although length constraints preclude a comprehensive catalogue of support 
for the existence of a primary rule on sovereignty, that which is set forth 
below is proffered regarding the substance of the norm as well as to indicate 
the breadth and depth of the corroborating evidence. 
A.  Judicial Treatment 
The premise that it is unlawful for a State to act on the territory of 
another State without the latter’s consent has long been recognized by 
international tribunals.  In the 1927 Lotus Case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice observed that “the first and foremost restriction imposed 
by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a 
permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in 
 
(“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for 
primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States . . . .”).  The classic case addressing these 
requirements is North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3 (Feb. 20).  For further discussion, see INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON FORMATION OF 
CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 10 (2000); Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction 
Between Customary International Law and Treaties, in RECUEIL DES COURS 322 (2006). 
55. ICJ Statute, supra note 54, art. 38(1)(d). 
56. Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, First Report on Formation and 
Evidence of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663, at 21 (May 17, 2013); INT’L 
LAW ASS’N, supra note 54, at 4, 19. 
57. ICJ Statute, supra note 54, art. 38(1)(d); see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at xii–
xxii (listing scholars from various nations contributing to both the Tallinn Manual 2.0 and Tallinn 
Manual 1.0). 
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the territory of another State.”58  In other words, the court treated the principle 
as one that sets binding limits on a State’s activities on foreign territory; when 
a State acts without the territorial State’s consent, the former is in breach of 
an obligation owed the latter to respect its sovereignty. 
This view of the law has been adopted by the Permanent Court’s 
successor, the International Court of Justice.  Indeed, in its first case, Corfu 
Channel, the court dealt with accusations of violations of sovereignty.59  The 
case involved an incident in which British warships passing through the 
Corfu Channel in Albanian territorial waters in 1946 struck naval mines.60  
Following the incident, the Royal Navy again sailed through the waters, this 
time to conduct minesweeping operations.61  The United Kingdom sought a 
finding that Albania was responsible for the damage to two of its vessels and 
the ensuing loss of life, and an order that it pay compensation.62  Albania 
counterclaimed, asking the court to decide whether the “United Kingdom 
under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People’s 
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters,” and, 
if so, whether there was a duty to provide satisfaction.63 
The court held Albania responsible for the damage and loss of life on 
the basis that it had failed to warn the United Kingdom of the dangers posed 
by transit through the Corfu Channel.64  More important to the territorial-
sovereignty issue were the findings of the court relative to Albania’s claim.  
The United Kingdom did not contest Albania’s sovereignty over the waters, 
nor did it suggest the absence of a norm precluding violations of sovereignty.  
Instead, it argued that a special maritime legal regime, innocent passage, 
allowed for transit through international straits lying in a State’s territorial 
sea, even in the absence of consent.65  The court agreed and therefore was 
“unable to accept the Albanian contention that the Government of the United 
Kingdom ha[d] violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships 
through the Strait without having obtained the previous authorization of the 
Albanian Government.”66  The waters were subject to territorial sovereignty, 
but an exception applied. 
 
58. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
59. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. at 6. 
60. Id. at 12–13. 
61. Id. at 13. 
62. Id. at 10–11. 
63. Id. at 6. 
64. Id. at 23. 
65. Id. at 27.  As it is an international strait, under the modern law of the sea, passage through 
the Corfu Channel would be “transit passage.”  Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 30, arts. 37–
38. 
66. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. at 29–30. 
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An opposite conclusion was reached with respect to the minesweeping.  
Because the operations were conducted without Albania’s consent, and no 
exception operated, the court concluded that: 
Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations.  The Court recognizes 
that the Albanian Government’s complete failure to carry out its duties 
after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are 
extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom 
Government.  But to ensure respect for international law, of which it 
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy 
co[n]stituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.67 
Since the 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, the International Court of 
Justice has continued to address the issue of, and often find, internationally 
wrongful violations of sovereignty.  In 1973, it considered the legality of 
French atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific.68  The case, Nuclear 
Tests, involved an Australian request for a declaratory judgment that the 
French testing violated international law, as well as a permanent order 
prohibiting France from carrying out further tests.69  Although it was 
dismissed on procedural grounds, what is relevant to the issue of breach of 
sovereignty as a primary rule is the Australian government’s position that the 
“deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of Australia and its dispersion 
in Australia’s airspace without Australia’s consent . . . violates Australian 
sovereignty over its territory.”70 
In its Memorial, Australia set forth its legal logic in making the claim: 
The Government of Australia repeats that its case rests upon several 
bases: on the mere fact of trespass, on the harmful effects associated 
with trespass, and on the impairment of its independent right to 
determine what acts shall take place within its territory.  In this 
connection, the Government of Australia wants to emphasize that the 
mere fact of trespass, the harmful effects which flow from such fall-
out and the impairment of its independence, each clearly constitute a 
violation of the affected State’s sovereignty over and in respect of its 
territory.71 
The court then addressed the issue of a legal right to allege a violation 
of sovereignty. 
The evident character of Australia’s legal interest in a claim alleging 
violation of its sovereignty over and in respect of its territory is such 
 
67. Id. at 35. 
68. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 254 (Dec. 20). 
69. Id. ¶ 26. 
70. Application, Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, ¶ 49(ii)(a) (May 9). 
71. Memorial of Australia, Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Pleadings 249, ¶ 454 
(Nov. 23). 
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as to make any extended argument upon this point superfluous.  It is, 
indeed, quite obvious that a State possesses a legal interest in the 
protection of its territory from any form of external harmful action, as 
well as in the defence of the well-being of its population and in the 
protection of national integrity and independence.  It would indeed be 
positively absurd to suggest otherwise.  If a State did not possess a 
legal interest in such matters, how could Portugal have brought the 
Naulilaa case against Germany . . . ; how could Albania have brought 
against the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel case . . . the claim 
arising out of the sweeping of mines in Albanian territorial waters?  
The point does not require elaboration.72 
At least from the Australian perspective, even unintentional effects 
manifesting on its territory sufficed to breach territorial inviolability. 
The International Court of Justice again faced the issue of territorial 
sovereignty in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment.73  The case involved 
Nicaragua’s assertion that the United States had breached its obligations 
under “general and customary international law” and “violated and is 
violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua” by “armed attacks against Nicaragua 
by air, land and sea”; “incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters”; “aerial 
trespass into Nicaraguan airspace”; and “efforts by direct and indirect means 
to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua.”74 
When considering these claims, the court acknowledged linkage 
between State sovereignty and the prohibitions of the use of force and 
coercive intervention, but unambiguously differentiated between them, 
noting that a single act may violate more than one of the prescriptive norms: 
The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty 
inevitably overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the 
use of force and of nonintervention.  Thus the assistance to the 
contras, as well as the direct attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil 
installations, etc., . . . not only amount to an unlawful use of force, but 
also constitute infringements of the territorial sovereignty of 
Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial and internal waters.  
Similarly, the mining operations in the Nicaraguan ports not only 
constitute breaches of the principle of the nonuse of force, but also 
affect Nicaragua’s sovereignty over certain maritime expanses.  The 
Court has in fact found that these operations were carried on in 
Nicaragua’s territorial or internal waters or both . . . and accordingly 
they constitute a violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty.  The principle 
of respect for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the 
 
72. Id. ¶ 456. 
73. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27). 
74. Id. ¶ 250. 
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unauthorized overflight of a State’s territory by aircraft belonging to 
or under the control of the government of another State.75 
In the opinion of the court, then, territorial sovereignty enjoys 
independent valence.  Indeed, it felt obligated to apprise the facts based on 
the “duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of others.”76  
Ultimately, the court found that the United States, through various actions, 
breached obligations under customary law with respect to intervention, use 
of force, and violation of territorial sovereignty.77  In doing so, it treated 
violation of territorial sovereignty as a self-standing primary norm with no 
less normative force than the other two. 
In 2015, the International Court of Justice examined Costa Rica’s 
allegations that Nicaragua had sent armed forces into Costa Rican territory 
and dug a channel thereon, and Nicaragua’s contentions that Costa Rica had 
built a road in the contested area and caused transboundary environmental 
damage to Nicaragua.78  Both sides claimed that these actions violated their 
respective sovereignties.  They disputed their opponent’s claims on the basis 
that no violation had occurred because the other side did not enjoy 
sovereignty over the areas in question.  Extracts from the judgment exemplify 
the legal argumentation of the two States: 
Costa Rica alleges that Nicaragua violated its territorial sovereignty in 
the area of Isla Portillos in particular by excavating in 2010 a caño 
with the aim of connecting the San Juan River with the Harbor Head 
Lagoon and laying claim to Costa Rican territory.  According to Costa 
Rica, this violation of sovereignty was exacerbated by Nicaragua’s 
establishment of a military presence in the area and by its excavation 
in 2013 of two other caños located near the northern tip of Isla 
Portillos.79 
 . . . . 
 Nicaragua does not contest that it dredged the three caños, but 
maintains that “Nicaragua enjoys full sovereignty over the caño 
joining Harbor Head Lagoon with the San Juan River proper, the right 
bank of which constitutes the land boundary as established by the 
1858 Treaty . . . .”  Nicaragua further submits that “Costa Rica is under 
an obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
 
75. Id. ¶ 251. 
76. Id. ¶ 213. 
77. Id. ¶ 292. 
78. Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 
2015 I.C.J. Rep. 1, 2–4 (Dec. 16), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/18848.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5RWF-RS9U]. 
79. Id. ¶ 66. 
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Nicaragua, within the boundaries delimited by the 1858 Treaty of 
Limits . . . .”80 
For its part, the court adopted the same territorial sovereignty-based line 
of analysis.  As an example, it observed, “[s]ince it is uncontested that 
Nicaragua conducted certain activities in the disputed territory, it is 
necessary, in order to establish whether there was a breach of Costa Rica’s 
territorial sovereignty, to determine which State has sovereignty over that 
territory.”81  After answering that question, it unanimously found that “by 
excavating three caños and establishing a military presence on Costa Rican 
territory, Nicaragua has violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica.”82 
In fact, the court left no room for debate regarding whether sovereignty 
can be violated as a matter of international law; it employed classic terms and 
concepts from the law of State responsibility, including “breach,” 
“responsible for breach,” and “obligation to make reparation,” thereby 
affirming that the obligation to respect territorial sovereignty is legally 
binding.83  Moreover, because the court found that Nicaragua had violated 
Costa Rica’s sovereignty, it held that it did not have to determine whether 
Nicaragua’s conduct amounted to a breach of the prohibition on the threat or 
use of force under the U.N. Charter or the Charter of the Organization of 
American States.84  Finally, the court also noted that its determination that 
Nicaragua had breached the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica “provides 
adequate satisfaction for the nonmaterial injury suffered on this account.”85 
At no time in the case did either party assert the absence of a primary 
rule prohibiting violations of sovereignty.  On the contrary, that rule lay at 
the heart of both sides’ claims.  Nor did the court consider that option.  All 
involved took the rule’s existence as a normative given, and the court 
rendered its judgment on that basis. 
B.  State Practice and Opinio Juris 
Unlike judicial decisions, State practice and expressions of opinio juris 
are obligatory elements of any claim that an obligation to respect sovereignty 
is legally binding in customary international law.  In this regard, it must be 
noted that States sometimes act in ways that affect, but do not violate, the 
exercise of sovereign rights of other States, such as imposing sanctions that 
 
80. Id. ¶ 68. 
81. Id. ¶ 69. 
82. Id. ¶ 229. 
83. “These activities were in breach of Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty.  Nicaragua is 
responsible for these breaches and consequently incurs the obligation to make reparation for the 
damage caused by its unlawful activities . . . .”  Id. ¶ 93. 
84. Id. ¶¶ 96–99. 
85. Id. ¶ 139. 
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impact another State’s domestic economic activities.86  Additionally, the term 
“sovereignty” frequently appears in political statements without necessarily 
carrying legal weight.  Thus, it is essential to be sensitive to customary law’s 
formal components of State practice and opinio juris when examining what 
States do, how they react to actions by other States, and what their officials 
say publicly.  The examples that follow have been carefully selected as 
illustrations of the way in which States treat the issue of sovereignty in 
international law, rather than as an international relations concept. 
States have characterized a plethora of incidents as violations of their 
territorial sovereignty.87  It must be cautioned that some involved the armed 
forces and therefore may also have implicated the prohibitions of the use of 
force or coercive intervention.  The fact that States at times chose to discuss 
an incident as a breach of their territorial inviolability when the actions might 
also have crossed the use-of-force or coercive-intervention thresholds 
demonstrates that States consider the former to be a primary rule distinct 
from other primary rules that are based in the principle of sovereignty. 
Unconsented-to aerial intrusions have long been considered a violation 
of the subjacent State’s territorial sovereignty.  Noteworthy in this regard is 
the incident involving the downing of an unarmed American U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft by the Soviet Union and the capture of its pilot in 
1960.88  The United States did not protest the shoot-down.  This reaction 
contrasts sharply with U.S. condemnation of the downing of an RB-47 
reconnaissance aircraft by Soviet fighters and the imprisonment of its crew 
the same year.89 
The difference can only be explained by virtue of the locations of the 
aircraft at the time of the shoot-downs, since both incidents involved military 
aircraft performing similar missions in the same year.  In the case of the U-
2, the aircraft was in Soviet national airspace, which both sides appeared to 
acknowledge was subject to Soviet sovereignty.90  By contrast, the RB-47 
was flying in what the United States characterized as international airspace 
above the high seas.91  Accordingly, while the former involved a violation of 
 
86. See André Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 REVUE BELGE 
DE DROIT INT’L 57, 67–69 (1984) (discussing the line that demarcates economic sanctions that are 
acceptable under international law from those that are not). 
87. On the salience of examining incidents in the identification of international law norms, see 
W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1984) (“The normative expectations that political 
analysts infer from events are the substance of much of contemporary international law.”). 
88. See Oliver Lissitzyn, Editorial Comment, Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 
Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 135 (1962) (describing the incident). 
89. See id. at 136 (describing the incident). 
90. Department Statement, May 7, DEP’T OF ST. BULL., Jan. 4, 1960, at 818; Text of Soviet 
Note, DEP’T OF ST. BULL., July 11, 1960, at 164. 
91. RB-47H Shot Down, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/Display/tabid/509/Article/1
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national airspace, and thereby the Soviet Union’s territorial sovereignty, the 
latter, at least in the U.S. view, did not. 
Four decades later, in 2001, U.S. military personnel aboard an unarmed 
EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft were detained after making a forced landing on 
a Chinese island following a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter.  China 
protested the nonconsensual landing, claiming, in part, that the American 
aircraft had “entered China’s airspace without permission, [thereby] 
seriously violating China’s territorial sovereignty.”92  The United States 
responded that the aircraft had been outside Chinese national airspace at the 
time of the collision and only entered it once in distress.  It argued that while 
“military aircraft normally require permission to enter the territorial airspace 
of another nation,” the wrongfulness of penetrating foreign airspace while in 
distress is precluded.93  The dispute in the case was not over the existence of 
a rule prohibiting unconsented-to entry into another State’s sovereign 
airspace, but rather the application of a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness.  Indeed, by relying on the notion of distress, it can only be 
concluded that the United States accepted that the action would, absent such 
a circumstance, have amounted to an internationally wrongful act. 
The debate over counterterrorist drone strikes similarly have focused 
attention on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Although drone 
operations implicate the prohibition on the use of force, States regularly 
characterize them as sovereignty violations.  For instance, Pakistan has 
repeatedly taken the position that “drone strikes on its territory are 
counterproductive, contrary to international law, a violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and should cease immediately.”94  
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has echoed this position, stating, “It 
is not right to violate the sovereignty and integrity of any State.  We fully 
support Pakistan’s stance.”95  As explained below, the U.S. justification for 
the strikes likewise is framed in the narrative of sovereignty. 
Analogous incidents have taken place at sea.  In March 2007, fifteen 
British military personnel from the HMS Cornwall were searching a 
merchant dhow in the Persian Gulf96 when they were captured and 
subsequently detained for nearly two weeks by Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 
 
97621/rb-47h-shot-down.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9GS-D3K9].  On the distinction, see also 
Lissitzyn, supra note 88, 136–37. 
92. Surveillance Activities and Emergency Landing by U.S. Aircraft on Hainan Island, 
People’s Republic of China, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ch. 12, § A(6)(3) at 707. 
93. Id. at 708. 
94. Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur), Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013). 
95. Omer Farooq Khanl, Russia Backs Pakistan Fury on US Drones, TIMES INDIA (Oct. 5, 
2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Russia-backs-Pakistan-fury-on-US-
drones/articleshow/16678916.cms [https://perma.cc/D9VF-V36U]. 
96. The operation was conducted in accordance with S.C. Res. 1723 (Nov. 28, 2006). 
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Guard forces.97  Each side claimed the other had acted unlawfully based on 
the location of the incident; the United Kingdom stated that its forces were 
in Iraqi territorial waters, whereas Iran asserted that they were operating in 
Iranian waters.  An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, for example, argued 
that the British forces were “violating the sovereign boundaries” of Iran at 
the time of their seizure.98  An investigation by the British Ministry of 
Defence concluded that a factor contributing to the incident was “[t]he 
absence of an internationally agreed delineation of Territorial Waters (TTW) 
and [Northern Arabian Gulf] water-space coordination measures between 
Iraq, Iran and Coalition Authorities.”99  The dispute was conducted in the 
vernacular of the violation of territorial sovereignty. 
Nine years after the British–Iranian incident, the Iranian Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps captured two U.S. Navy riverine craft with 
military personnel aboard after they mistakenly penetrated Iranian territorial 
waters.  The Revolutionary Guards labeled the incident an “illegal entry into 
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s waters.”100  Following negotiations, the ten 
individuals were released and the boats returned.  Far from criticizing Iran 
for its actions in seizing the crew, Secretary of State John Kerry thanked them 
for their cooperation.101  The United States understood the boats had violated 
Iranian sovereignty, albeit mistakenly. 
Standing maritime territorial disputes regularly generate breach of 
territorial sovereignty claims.  Most well known are those over South China 
Sea maritime boundaries, which are disputed by multiple countries in the 
region.  The U.S. Navy conducts “Freedom of Navigation” (FON) operations 
in areas where it believes China has made excessive maritime claims, and 
China typically shadows the warships and warns them out of its purported 
territory.102  Such disputes even arise among close allies.  For instance, in a 
 
97. Seized Sailors ‘Taken to Tehran’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/uk_news/6489493.stm [https://perma.cc/E9XF-X4KU]. 
98. Iran Claims U.K. Troops Admit to Illegal Entry, NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2007), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17769296/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/iran-claims-uk-troops-
admit-illegal-entry/ [https://perma.cc/2BC9-DB9B]. 
99. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UK BOARDING OPERATIONS BY CTF 158 IN THE NORTHERN 
ARABIAN GULF (NAG), 2007, CJO/D/LM (20/07) (UK). 
100. Iran Frees Captured US Marines, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 13, 2016), http://en. 
farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941023000875 [https://perma.cc/C74A-ZNPP]. 
101. David E. Sanger et al., Iran’s Swift Release of U.S. Sailors Hailed as a Sign of Warmer 
Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/world/middleeast/ 
iran-navy-crew-release.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8CCQ-REJY]. 
102. Kristina Daugirdas & Julian D. Mortenson, United States Conducts Naval Operation 
Within Twelve Nautical Miles of Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Prompting Protests from 
China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 120 (2016).  For background and information on the Freedom of 
Navigation Program, see the Department of Defense’s fact sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FREEDOM OF 
NAVIGATION PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2015), http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/ 
11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/DoD%20FON%20Program%20—%20Fact%20Sheet%20(March 
%202015).pdf  [https://perma.cc/LT9Y-FFAE]. 
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well-known 1985 incident, a Coast Guard icebreaker navigated through the 
Northwest Passage, which the United States claims is an international strait, 
without seeking Canadian permission.103  In response, Canada “granted 
permission” (despite the lack of a request to that effect) for the voyage and, 
although the two countries agreed to the presence of Canadian observers 
onboard, the United States still disputed the Canadian claim of sovereignty 
over the waters.104 
On land, the abduction of Adolph Eichmann is a classic case regarding 
territorial sovereignty. Eichmann had headed the Gestapo’s Section for 
Jewish Affairs and was responsible for implementation of the Final 
Solution.105  Following the war, he fled to Argentina.106  In May 1960, the 
Israeli Mossad abducted Eichmann from Argentina and brought him to Israel 
for trial in the District Court of Jerusalem.107 
Following the incident, but before trial, Argentina elevated the issue to 
the U.N. Security Council.  In a letter to the Security Council, it submitted 
that “[t]he illicit and clandestine transfer of Eichmann from Argentine 
territory constitutes a flagrant violation of the Argentine State’s right of 
sovereignty.”108  After considering the matter, the Council adopted 
Resolution 138, in which it observed that the “violation of the sovereignty of 
a Member State is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations,” and 
requested that the Israeli government make appropriate reparation for its 
actions.109  Israel and Argentina subsequently issued a joint communiqué 
stating that they viewed as settled “the incident which was caused through 
the action of citizens of Israel that has violated the basic rights of the State of 
Argentina.”110 
In dealing with the question of whether a covert abduction operation in 
another country without that country’s consent negated its jurisdiction, the 
 
103. Michael Byers, The Need to Defend Our New Northwest Passage, TYEE (Jan. 30, 2006), 
https://thetyee.ca/Views/2006/01/30/DefendNorthwestPassage/ [https://perma.cc/VFD6-98GW]. 
104. Id. 
105. Adolf Eichmann, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM: HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007412 [https://perma.cc/8P6J-SF65]. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Letter from Mario Amadeo, Representative of Arg., to the U.N. Sec. Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/4336 (June 15, 1960). 
109. S.C. Res. 138, pmbl., ¶ 2 (June 23, 1960).  The explicit reference to a “violation of the 
sovereignty of a Member State” appears in the resolution’s preamble, whereas the operative part 
cites “acts . . . which affect the sovereignty of a Member State.”  Id. pmbl., ¶ 1.  This should not be 
interpreted as if the Security Council may not necessarily have regarded Israel’s action as unlawful.  
On the contrary, because the Security Council directed Israel to provide reparation “in accordance 
with . . . the rules of international law,” it must have concluded that a violation of international law 
had occurred; otherwise, no obligation to provide reparation would have materialized.  Id. ¶ 2. 
110. CrimC (Jer) 40/61 Att’y-Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann, PM 5722 ¶ 50 (1962) (Isr.) 
(quoting the Joint Communiqué of Israel and Argentina, reprinted in Att’y-Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. 
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 59 (Isr., Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem 1961)). 
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District Court did not question the position that disrespect for territorial 
sovereignty can constitute a violation of international law.  Clearly operating 
from the premise that such activities can do so, it concluded: 
[N]ow that the Governments of Argentina and Israel have issued their 
joint communique . . . to the effect that both governments have 
decided to view as liquidated the “incident” whereby the sovereignty 
of Argentina was violated, the Accused in this case can certainly retain 
no right to base himself on the “violated sovereignty” of the State of 
Argentina.  The indictment in this case was presented after Argentina 
had forgiven Israel for that violation of her sovereignty, so that there 
no longer subsisted any violation of international law.  In these 
circumstances, the Accused cannot presume to be speaking on behalf 
of Argentina and cannot claim rights which that sovereign state has 
waived.111 
That an extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction amounts to 
a violation of sovereignty of the State in which it occurs is now well settled 
in international law.112 
An interesting incident concerning territorial sovereignty over both 
national airspace and land occurred in 1978, when a Soviet spacecraft with a 
nuclear reactor onboard, Cosmos 954, reentered the earth’s atmosphere into 
Canadian airspace.113  During reentry, the spacecraft disintegrated and debris 
was scattered across a wide swath of Canada.  Canada claimed for 
compensation, both on the basis of the Convention on International Liability 
 
111. Id. ¶ 44. 
112. “A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another 
state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1986).  Professor Louis 
Henkin suggested that “[w]hen done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person 
from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm high 
in the opinion of mankind.  It is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state . . . .”  
Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 
231 (1992).  The fact that a State’s unauthorized exercise of extraterritorial-enforcement jurisdiction 
amounts to a violation of the other State’s sovereignty is also acknowledged in Tallinn Manual 2.0.  
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 19, 67 (noting “[t]he Experts agreed that a violation of 
sovereignty occurs whenever one State physically crosses into the territory or national airspace of 
another State without either its consent or another justification in international law . . . ” and stating 
“the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction on another State’s territory constitutes a violation of that 
State’s sovereignty . . . except when international law provides a specific allocation of authority to 
exercise enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially or when the State in which it is to be exercised 
consents”).  Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has accepted that an 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction may violate another State’s sovereignty.  Rep. of the Office 
of U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). 
113. See Settlement of Claim Between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for 
Damage Caused by “Cosmos 954,” Canada–U.S.S.R., Apr. 2, 1981 [hereinafter Settlement of 
Claim]. 
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for Damage Caused by Space Objects114 and “general principles of 
international law.”115  The dispute was settled in 1981 by means of a protocol 
between Canada and the Soviet Union.116  Of particular relevance to the issue 
of territorial sovereignty was the approach taken by Canada in its Statement 
of Claim: 
The intrusion of the Cosmos 954 satellite into Canada’s air space and 
the deposit on Canadian territory of hazardous radioactive debris from 
the satellite constitutes a violation of Canada’s sovereignty.  This 
violation is established by the mere fact of the trespass of the satellite, 
the harmful consequences of this intrusion, being the damage caused 
to Canada by the presence of hazardous radioactive debris and the 
interference with the sovereign right of Canada to determine the acts 
that will be performed on its territory.  International precedents 
recognize that a violation of sovereignty gives rise to an obligation to 
pay compensation.117 
Regarding opinio juris, senior government officials in many nations 
have referred for decades to the violation of sovereignty in a fashion that 
qualifies as such.  Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev, for example, in 
pointing to the notion of coexistence, stated in 1959 that: 
Apart from the commitment to nonaggression, [coexistence] also 
presupposes an obligation on the part of all states to desist from 
violating each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form 
and under any pretext whatsoever.  The principle of peaceful 
coexistence signifies a renunciation of interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of 
government or mode of life or for any other motives.118 
Note that Khrushchev not only confirmed Soviet acceptance of a rule 
prohibiting violation of territorial sovereignty, but also treated it separately 
from interference in internal affairs (coercive intervention). 
Similarly, U.S. government representatives regularly offer expressions 
of opinio juris that operate from the premise of territorial sovereignty’s 
inviolability.  To illustrate, numerous statements, including ones issued with 
other States, were made on this basis during, and in the aftermath of, the 
conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2009.  Following the ceasefire, for 
example, the State Department’s spokesperson noted that Russia’s plans to 
build up its military presence in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South 
 
114. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. II, 
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. 
115. Settlement of Claim, supra note 113, ¶ 14. 
116. Protocol in Respect of the Claim for Damages Caused by the Satellite “Cosmos 954,” 
Canada–U.S.S.R, Apr. 2, 1981. 1470 U.N.T.S. 269. 
117. Settlement of Claim, supra note 113, ¶ 21. 
118. Nikita S. Khrushchev, On Peaceful Coexistence, 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 3 (1959). 
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Ossetia would not only breach the ceasefire agreement but also violate 
Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.119 
More recently, Russian activities with respect to the Ukraine conflict, 
including Russia’s belligerent occupation of the Crimean peninsula since 
2014, have consistently been portrayed as violations of sovereignty.  
President Obama characterized Russian actions as such when discussing the 
matter with President Putin in March 2014.120  The same month, the United 
States delivered a statement at the U.N. Human Rights Council on behalf of 
forty-two nations expressing concern over Russia’s “ongoing violation of 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”;121 the G-7 did likewise.122  
President Obama then stated that Russia “flagrantly violated the sovereignty 
and territory of an independent European nation, Ukraine” during his 
“Address to the People of Europe” in April,123 a claim he repeated at the 
NATO Warsaw Summit the same year.124 
Many relevant statements have been made with respect to 
counterterrorist operations.  In a speech at National Defense University in 
2013, President Obama noted that “our actions are bound by consultations 
with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.”125  Other members of his 
administration repeatedly made the same point.126  Attorney General Eric 
 
119. Russia/Georgia, 2009 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ch. 18, §A(1)(b)(2) at 689; see also Ian Kelly, Statement on the 24th Round of the Geneva 
Discussions on the Conflict in Georgia (July 4, 2013), https://osce.usmission.gov/jul_4 
_13_georgia/ [https://perma.cc/6R3Y-JGXE]. 
120. Megan Slack, Responding to the Situation in Ukraine, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 20, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/02/20/responding-situation-ukraine 
[https://perma.cc/V7US-C4HS]. 
121. Joint Statement by 42 States at the Human Rights Council on the Situation in Ukraine, 
THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA (Mar. 26, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/03/26/joint-
statement-by-42-states-at-the-human-rights-council-on-the-situation-in-ukraine/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q2UC-CBKA]. 
122. G-7 Leaders Statement, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 2, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/02/g-7-leaders-statement [https://perma.cc/5KGS-FJXR]. 
123. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of Europe, WHITE HOUSE 
(Apr.  25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/remarks-
president-obama-address-people-europe [https://perma.cc/R3N4-B2E2]. 
124. Press Conference by President Obama after NATO Summit, WHITE HOUSE (July 9, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/09/press-conference-president-
obama-after-nato-summit [https://perma.cc/ZZ38-5NTP]. 
125. Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 
2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-
national-defense-university [https://perma.cc/A26W-6NTV]. 
126. John O. Brennan, Remarks of John O. Brennan, “Strengthening our Security by Adhering 
to our Values and Laws”, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 16, 2011), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [https://perma.cc/X3TT-Z2JF]; Jeh Johnson, 
Jeh Johnson’s Speech on “National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama 
Administration”, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/national-
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Holder, speaking at Northwestern University School of Law, earlier had 
confirmed that “[i]nternational legal principles, including respect for another 
nation’s sovereignty, constrain our ability to act unilaterally.”127  His 
comments were especially salient, for the Justice Department renders the 
final decision on questions of law for the Executive Branch.128  The thread 
running through all of the statements has been recognition of an affirmative 
legal duty to respect the territorial sovereignty of other States in the conduct 
of U.S. counterterrorist operations; as a legal obligation, the duty represents 
a substantive rule, not simply the articulation of a broad normative principle 
or a restatement of the prohibitions of the use of force or coercive 
intervention. 
Increasingly, senior U.S. government officials have acknowledged this 
duty with respect to activities in cyberspace.  State Department Legal Adviser 
Harold Koh offered the first major statement on the matter in 2012 at an 
interagency legal conference convened at U.S. Cyber Command.129  In the 
speech, he addressed the issue of sovereignty head on. 
States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the 
sovereignty of other States, including outside the context of armed 
conflict.  The physical infrastructure that supports the internet and 
cyber activities is generally located in sovereign territory and subject 
to the jurisdiction of the territorial State.  Because of the 
interconnected, interoperable nature of cyberspace, operations 
targeting networked information infrastructures in one country may 
create effects in another country.  Whenever a State contemplates 
conducting activities in cyberspace, the sovereignty of other States 
needs to be considered.130 
The position was clear. Remote cyber operations that cause effects in 
other States implicate, inter alia, the territorial sovereignty of those States.  
Koh spoke to the fact that it is incumbent on the State planning a remote 
cyber operation to consider whether the effects generated abroad breach the 
obligation to respect other States’ territorial sovereignty; while he did not 
 
security-and-defense/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-
administration/p27448 [https://perma.cc/6HHS-LZEE]. 
127. Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-
holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school-law [https://perma.cc/KFH8-4N44]. 
128. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–13 (1966).  Consider this statute in light of 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2017).  
129. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Dep’t, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command 
Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012) (transcript available at Chris Borgen, Harold Koh 
on International Law in Cyberspace, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://opiniojuris 
.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/ [https://perma .cc/MJS5-XJVA]). 
130. Id.  On the speech in relation to Tallinn Manual 1.0, see Michael N. Schmitt, International 
Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 
13 (2012). 
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answer the question of when cyber operations violate sovereignty, he clearly 
accepted that in certain circumstances they do. 
In a 2016 address at Berkeley Law School, Koh’s successor, Brian 
Egan, explicitly confirmed this point. 
The very design of the Internet may lead to some encroachment on 
other sovereign jurisdictions.  Precisely when a nonconsensual cyber 
operation violates the sovereignty of another State is a question 
lawyers within the U.S. government continue to study carefully, and 
it is one that ultimately will be resolved through the practice and 
opinio juris of States.131 
There was no suggestion that either of the former State Department 
Legal Advisers believed that sovereignty-related internationally wrongful 
acts in cyberspace were limited to uses of force or coercive intervention.  On 
the contrary, both acknowledged that the principle of sovereignty applies in 
the cyber context and, by virtue of its legally binding nature, has operational 
significance. 
This position tracks that contained in the 2014 U.S. submission to the 
U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security (GGE).  Stressing the application of sovereignty rules to the 
extraterritorial causation of effects, it noted, 
Most cyber activities undertaken by States and other actors fall below 
the threshold of the use of force and outside of the context of armed 
conflict.  Such activities, however, do not take place in a legal vacuum.  
Instead, they are governed by, inter alia, international legal principles 
that pertain to State sovereignty, human rights, and State 
responsibility. 
 . . . . 
 State sovereignty, among other long-standing international legal 
principles, must be taken into account in the conduct of activities in 
cyberspace, including outside of the context of armed conflict.  
Because of the interconnected, interoperable nature of cyberspace, 
operations targeting networked information infrastructures in one 
country can have effects in many countries around the world.  
Whenever a State contemplates conducting activities in cyberspace, 
the sovereignty of other States needs to be considered.132 
 
131. Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at Berkeley Law School on 
International Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6TH-232L]. 
132. Applicability of International Law to Conflicts in Cyberspace, 2014 DIGEST OF UNITED 
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, § A(3)(b), at 737.  Interestingly, the Department 
of Defense’s own Law of War Manual emphasizes the obligation in an armed conflict to respect the 
sovereignty of other States during cyber operations because “cyber operations targeting networked 
information infrastructures in one State may create effects in another State that is not a party to the 
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Other States also apply a substantive, vice foundational, rule of 
territorial inviolability to cyber activities, distinguishing it from separate 
relevant primary rules of international law.  For instance, indicative of the 
Netherlands government’s views were the opening comments of the Foreign 
Minister Bert Koenders at the 2017 European launch of Tallinn Manual 
2.0.133  In his speech, he noted that “we mustn’t be naive.  Cyber operations 
against institutions, political parties and individuals underline why we need 
the international legal principles of sovereignty and nonintervention in the 
affairs of other states.”134  In light of the hostile cyber operations he cited, the 
Minister can only have attributed operational consequence to the principle of 
sovereignty, which he distinguished from nonintervention.  He went on to 
emphasize that “[t]he Tallinn Manual provides guidance on the application 
of long-established legal principles in the cyber domain: sovereignty, 
nonintervention, due diligence, and state responsibility.”135  That guidance, 
as explained, attributes primary-rule significance to sovereignty, a point that 
could not have been lost on the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
C.  Sovereignty in International Fora 
Both the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly have treated 
the violation of sovereignty as a primary rule.  For example, the Security 
Council resolution cited above in the Eichmann case specifically referred to 
“violation of the sovereignty of a Member State.”136  But among resolutions 
by U.N. organs, the General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
 
armed conflict.”  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1019 
(2016).  Although framed in the context of neutrality, such an operation in an international armed 
conflict could breach the State’s obligations with respect to both territorial sovereignty and 
neutrality.  During a noninternational armed conflict, only the former would be breached, as the law 
of neutrality applies only to international armed conflicts.  On neutrality, see Convention 
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land arts. 5, 10, 17, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 (discussing the nature of international neutrality) and Convention 
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War arts. 1–12, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2415 (establishing protocols for neutrality at sea).  In the cyber context, see TALLINN MANUAL 
2.0, supra note 12, at 553 (explaining the relationship between neutrality and cyber warfare). 
133. Bert Koenders, Foreign Minister, Neth., Remarks at The Hague Regarding Tallinn Manual 
2.0 (Feb. 13, 2017) (on file with authors). 
134. Id. See also the report by noted international law experts that was commissioned by the 
government of the Netherlands which found that “[i]nternational law is based on a strict prohibition 
of the use of force and a duty to respect the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of other states.  
These rights and duties are a two-way street . . . .” ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS AND THE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. INT’L LAW, No. 77 AIV/No. 22, CAVV, CYBER WARFARE 
22 (2011). 
135. Koenders, supra note 133. 
136. S.C. Res. 138, supra note 109, pmbl. 
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Relations is perhaps the most significant general pronouncement of law 
bearing on the existence of such a rule.137 
The resolution’s text is especially noteworthy because it represents an 
unusual consensus during the divisive Cold War.  In the Declaration, the 
General Assembly reaffirms “the basic importance of sovereign equality and 
[stresses] that the purposes of the United Nations can be implemented only 
if States enjoy sovereign equality and comply fully with the requirements of 
this principle in their international relations.”138  This carefully negotiated 
verbiage implies that there are certain State actions that are not in compliance 
with—that is, violate—the principle of sovereign equality.  This can only be 
so if sovereignty is more than an underlying principle; it must have operative 
effect. 
Sovereign equality is one of seven principles highlighted by the 
Declaration.  As to the principle, the resolution observes: “In particular, 
sovereign equality includes the following elements: . . . (d) [t]he territorial 
integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable . . . .”139  It is 
telling that the reference to territorial inviolability appears with regard to a 
principle, sovereign equality, that is set out separately from the principle 
requiring States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of other States.140  This being so, it can 
only be understood as applicable in its own right. 
Treaty law sheds further light on the existence of a rule prohibiting 
violations of territorial sovereignty.  The U.N. Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, for example, provides, 
States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention 
in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity of States and that of nonintervention in the 
domestic affairs of other States. 
 . . . Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake 
in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and 
performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the 
authorities of that other State by its domestic law.141 
Note how the first subparagraph distinguishes an act implicating 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity from one involving prohibited 
intervention, while the second deals with functions that are reserved to 
 
137. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
138. Id. pmbl. 
139. Id. (under preamble section titled “The principle of sovereign equality of States”). 
140. Id. (under preamble section titled “The principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”). 
141. G.A. Res. 55/25, annex, U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 4 
(Jan. 8, 2001). 
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another State, which, as explained above, is an additional basis for finding 
that an act violates sovereignty. 
Other treaties likewise acknowledge the inviolability of territory.  For 
instance, the Rio Treaty refers to “the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American 
State.”142  The Charter of the Organization of American States provides that 
“[t]he territory of a State is inviolable.”143  It also sets forth a collective 
security scheme that applies “[i]f the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State 
should be affected by . . . any . . . fact or situation that might endanger the 
peace of America.”144 
Statements on sovereignty in the context of cyber operations have also 
begun to appear in international fora.  In its 2013 report, the U.N. GGE, 
composed of representatives from fifteen States, stated that “State 
sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from 
sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their 
jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory.”145  Note how the 
GGE differentiates State sovereignty from the norms and principles that 
derive from sovereignty, thereby indicating a distinction between them.  Also 
significant is the GGE’s treatment of the applicability of sovereignty to cyber 
conduct in a way that distinguishes it from the mere exercise of jurisdiction 
over cyber activities. 
The GGE’s 2015 report expanded on this distinction: 
In their use of ICTs, States must observe, among other principles of 
international law, State sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement 
of disputes by peaceful means and nonintervention in the internal 
affairs of other States.  Existing obligations under international law 
are applicable to State use of ICTs.146 
In other words, the GGE singled out the principle of State sovereignty, 
differentiating it from that of nonintervention.  Moreover, the GGE did so in 
a paragraph that discusses the law that regulates State cyber operations, 
thereby accepting that the principle of sovereignty limits the “use” of cyber 
technologies vis-à-vis other States as a matter of international law. 
Finally, in 2016, the heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization issued a joint declaration in which they “call[ed] on the 
international community to develop a peaceful, secure, fair and open 
 
142. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) art. 6, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 
1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77. 
143. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 17, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
144. Id. art. 25. 
145. U.N. GGE 2013 Report, supra note 3, ¶ 20. 
146. U.N. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 3, ¶ 28(b). 
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information space based on the principles of cooperation and respect for 
national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other 
countries.”147  It is clear that the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other 
States enjoys wide recognition globally, including in the cyber context. 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
Corn and Taylor worry that a rule requiring respect for territorial 
sovereignty would impede important operations necessary to national 
security.  They warn, 
If the view were adopted that sovereignty is a rule violated by any 
action illegal under the domestic law of a state, states seeking to 
disrupt distributed terrorist cyber infrastructure would be under an 
obligation to either seek Security Council authorization or the consent 
of the state in whose territory the infrastructure resides. The nature of 
cyber operations and capabilities often require high degrees of 
operational security and the flexibility to act with speed and agility.  
Operating through a consent model could in important cases surrender 
operational initiative to the terrorist adversary or render response 
options unworkable.148 
Their concern is misplaced, for they treat the rule prohibiting violation 
of territorial sovereignty as absolute.  This badly misstates the view of those 
supporting its validity.  The rule’s proponents are clear that it does not apply 
to every remotely conducted cyber operation into another State’s territory.  
Indeed, they are divided over those operations that do breach inviolability.149  
The assertion that the rule on sovereignty somehow would leave a State 
defenseless in the face of serious threats to national security is also counter-
normative.  International law provides a robust toolbox for a State wishing to 
respond to hostile cyber operations that includes retorsion,150 
countermeasures,151 actions based on the plea of necessity,152 and self-
defense.153 
Moreover, the consequences of the absence of such a rule for States that 
are the target of hostile cyber operations would be unacceptable.  Although 
 
147. The Tashkent Declaration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN IN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA (June 28, 
2016), http://uzbekistan.lv/en/the-tashkent-declaration-of-the-fifteenth-anniversary-of-the-
shanghai-cooperation-organization/ [https://perma.cc/EC6V-QK6L]. 
148. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
149. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 19–21, 23. 
150. Acts that, albeit unfriendly, are lawful, such as economic sanctions.  Id. at 112. 
151. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 22; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 
12, at 111 (Rule 20). 
152. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 25; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 
12, at 135 (Rule 26). 
153. U.N. Charter art. 51; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 339 (Rule 71). 
SCHMITT.VIHUL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/17  8:43 AM 
2017] Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace 1669 
the precise threshold at which a cyber operation constitutes a use of force is 
unsettled in international law, it is undisputed that an offending operation 
must reach a high degree of severity.  By the Corn and Taylor approach, 
operations falling below that threshold would be governed solely by the 
prohibition on coercive intervention.  Yet a cyber operation that either does 
not affect a State’s domaine réservé or that is not coercive would not be 
encompassed in the prohibition.  As an example, consider a State’s disruptive 
cyber operations directed against commercial cyber infrastructure in another 
State intended to give the former’s own companies a competitive advantage.  
The operations would lie beyond the prohibition because such activities are 
generally not considered to fall within the domaine réservé.  Also 
problematic is the fact that cyber operations that are merely malicious or 
vindictive lack the requisite element of coercion. 
In law as in life, what one sees depends on where one stands.  Corn and 
Taylor take the perspective of those charged with conducting cyber 
operations into other States to defend the United States or otherwise advance 
its national interests.  Thus, it is unsurprising that, given the ease by which 
cyber operations cross borders and their increasing frequency and severity, 
they do not want the hands of the Department of Defense tied. 
But one must wonder whether government departments charged with 
the conduct of diplomacy or fashioning policy responses to hostile cyber 
operations will be amenable to forgoing the option of labeling other States’ 
hostile cyber operations as unlawful unless they cross the coercive-
intervention or use-of-force thresholds, especially in light of the fact that the 
vast majority of the operations do not.  Additionally, bringing down the 
normative firewall in the manner they propose would bar the taking of 
countermeasures in response to many hostile cyber operations because the 
operations would not qualify as internationally wrongful acts.154 
States facing cyber threats, but lacking the cyber wherewithal of the 
United States, are likewise unlikely to countenance a legal regime that opens 
the gates wide to hostile cyber operations.  It would leave them legally 
defenseless in the face of most such operations, and factually dependent on 
the United States or other cyber powers for assistance in responding to them.  
It is worth recalling that States enjoy sovereign equality; they all get a vote 
in the development and subsequent authoritative interpretation of 
international law.  That the international community will accept the 
 
154. Of course, by the Corn and Taylor approach, qualifying a cyber response as a 
countermeasure may not be necessary because under the scheme many of the responses themselves 
would not breach an obligation owed to the other State.  Yet, because responses need not be in-kind 
to qualify as lawful countermeasures, their approach would also remove the option of engaging in 
noncyber countermeasures.  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 12, at 128.  The nonavailability of 
countermeasures might be especially problematic from a policy perspective as the United States 
continues to search for effective means by which to deter other States’ hostile cyber operations 
directed against it. 
SCHMITT.VIHUL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/17  8:43 AM 
1670 Texas Law Review [Vol. 95:1639 
possibility of a cyber “wild west” below the intervention threshold is highly 
unlikely. 
As has been demonstrated, Corn’s and Taylor’s arguments fly in the 
face of long-standing State practice, opinio juris, and judicial decisions as to 
the application of the primary rule of sovereignty that safeguards territorial 
integrity and inviolability.  Indeed, they have cleverly attempted to shift the 
burden of persuasion in this regard.  However, the evidence of the rule is so 
dense that those asserting its nonapplicability to cyber operations manifesting 
on the territory of another State must, as a matter of law, bear the burden of 
establishing why it does not apply to cyber operations.  This they have failed 
to do. Instead, policy arguments and analysis are offered in the attempt to 
rebut a well-established legal notion. 
Ultimately, Corn and Taylor conclude,  
[W]hether and precisely when non-consensual cyber operations below 
the threshold of a prohibited intervention violate international law is a 
question that must be resolved through the practice and opinio juris of 
states, developed over time and in response to the need of states 
effectively to defend themselves and provide security for their 
citizens.155   
They are correct, but off course. Practice and opinio juris—and perhaps 
treaty law—will not determine whether territorial sovereignty is inviolable; 
it clearly is.  Rather, practice and opinio juris will inform the contours of the 
rule as applied in the cyber context.  Over time, it may even contribute to the 
emergence of lex specialis rules that provide for exceptions to the lex 
generalis rule protecting territorial integrity and inviolability.  But for the 
present, such possibilities amount to nothing more than lex ferenda. 
	
	
	
 
155. Corn & Taylor, supra note 16. 
